Abstract This paper deals with the forest owner's attitude towards risk and the harvesting decision in several ways. First, we propose to characterize and quantify the forest owner's attitude towards risk. Second, we analyze the determinants of the forest owner's risk attitude. Finally, we determine the impact of the forest owner's risk attitude on the harvesting decision. The French forest owner's risk attitude is tackled by implementing a questionnaire, including a context-free measure borrowed from experimental economics. The determinants of the forest owner's risk attitude and harvesting decision are estimated through a recursive bivariate ordered probit model. We show that French forest owners are characterized by a relative risk aversion coefficient close to 1 with a DARA assumption. In addition, we find that the forest owner's risk aversion is influenced positively and significantly by the level of risk exposure, the geographical location of the forest and the fact to be a forester, and negatively by the income. Finally, we obtain that the forest owner's risk aversion has a positive and significant impact on the harvesting decision.
Introduction
Forest management is exposed to several risks. These risks may be categorized as production risk or market risk. Market risk is due to potential variations of the discount rate and timber prices. Indeed, forest management is a longterm investment such that the discount rate and the price may fluctuate during the rotation. 1 Production risk is essentially due to natural events. In Europe, windstorms Lothar and Martin in 1999 damaged 140 million cubic meters in France and 30 million in Germany. Wildfires on summer 2003 burnt 500,000 ha in Portugal, 150,000 in Spain, and 95,000 in France. More generally, in Europe, natural hazards damage each year an average of 35 million m 3 of wood . Storms are responsible for 53% of these damages, fires for 16%, and biotic factors for 16%, respectively [52] . Climate change will have a serious impact on these disturbances. The occurrence of harmful disasters such as drought, flooding, wind, and fire is assumed to increase [29] . Populations of pests such as bark beetles and the frequency of the outbreak of tree diseases will be enhanced [59] . Natural disasters represent then a major treat for forest owners.
These natural events may represent important losses both for forest owners and for the economy. Indeed, forest owners may suffer loss in present and future value, additional costs of forest restoration, loss of other income, and loss of regular income [11] . Other losses may include loss of carbon sequestration [55] and amenities. In such a context, the forest owners take risky decisions as regards to management, harvesting, adaptation, coverage, etc. Consequently, the knowledge of the forest owner's risk preferences seems to be essential to implement forest risk management measure, to set up relevant adaptation strategy to cope with climate change, and also for public policy issue. Indeed, the forest owners' decisions vary in function of their attitude towards risk. For example, we can imagine that those who are risk averse should be more inclined to insure their forest against natural events, or to reduce the degree of exposure of their stand by reducing rotation length. In the same vein, those who express a risk-loving behavior should be more favorable to riskier management strategies in exchange of higher financial return. Then, several questions arise: what are the forest owner's risk preferences? What are the determinants of these risk preferences? And finally, what is the impact of these risk preferences on harvesting? In this paper, we try to answer these questions.
Investigating the forest owner's risk preferences leads to few papers. Some of them focused on preferences towards risk of Swedish forest owners [4, 5, 45] . They used questionnaires to ellicit these preferences. Andersson and Gong [5] find that a majority of private forest owners are risk neutral or risk prone while Lönnstedt and Svensson [45] proved that preferences depend on the amount at stakes. Some papers provide a measurement of these preferences towards risk. In Andersson [4] , an index of private forest owners' attitudes towards risk is derived from a hypothetical survey question involving financial risk, which is the owner's willingness to pay for reduction of the risk measured in terms of the variance of the outcome. In Musshof and Maart-Noelck [46] , the risk attitude of decision-makers from forestry organizations is inferred from a Holt and Laury's lottery [36] . Musshof and Maart-Noelck [46] show that participants are mostly risk averse (average number of safe choices of 5.87 among ten choices); they also show that risk aversion has a negative impact on the timing in sales decisions. Sauter et al. [51] also derive the measurement of risk preferences on a Holt and Laury's task. The sample is composed of 107 participants (foresters from private forest companies, public forest agencies and forest service providers). The estimate of risk aversion is then used in a more generalized analysis of the compliance between risky harvesting decisions and economic theories about the decision of when to harvest a stand. The authors obtained an average number of 11.69 safe choices among 20 choices, suggesting a low degree of risk aversion. Regarding the determinants of forest owner's risk preferences, to our knowledge, only one paper deals with this question. Andersson [4] analyzes the private forest owners' attitudes to financial risk-taking in forestry decisions. He shows that a longer period of ownership increases the probability that the owner is risk averse, while an increased time spent in the forest conducting silvicultural work increases the likelihood that an owner is risk seeking.
This literature highlights some important features. First, few papers try to quantify the forest owner's risk preferences and none of them provide an econometric estimation of the risk aversion coefficient of private forest owners. Second, even if the impact of risk preferences on the timing in sales and harvesting is analyzed, the impact of risk aversion on the probability to harvest is not evaluated. Finally, the determinants of the forest owner's risk attitude are only partially investigated, forgetting some important characteristics such as the forest owner's income.
Many theoretical papers also study the impact of owner's risk aversion on various type of decisions implying risk like rotation length [3, 20, 33, 56] , forest investments [39] , and decision to replant or not after a clear cutting [43] . In a general way, they derive a relationship between risk aversion and the decision they focused on. In addition, the impact of risk aversion on harvesting has also been studied by Brunette et al. [17] and Koskela [40] . These papers find that, as risk aversion increases, the probability to harvest reduces. However, to our knowledge, no empirical test of this theoretical result exists.
Finally, several papers investigate the determinants of private forest owners' harvesting decisions. For instance, Conway et al. [21] focus on the role of non-timber activities, bequest motives, and debt. They find that debt is a strong motivator for harvesting, that non-timber amenities are substitute to harvesting and that bequest motives decrease the probability of harvesting. Størdal et al. [54] study the impact of personal socio-economic characteristics, mainly the level of forest income and non-forest income of owners on harvesting. More precisely, they find that forest management plans, property size, forested area, income from agriculture, income from engagement in other outfield-related productions, and debt burden increase the propensity to harvest while wage income decreases the propensity to harvest. Garcia et al. [31] focus on social interactions and show that the behavior of private forest owners varies with the behavior of the group to which they belong. This effect is the result of mimicking mechanisms or social conditioning. Forest owners from the same region, therefore, tend to have the same production behavior. However, to our knowledge none of these studies consider the forest owner's risk attitude as a potential explanatory variable for harvesting decision.
In the present paper, we propose (i) to characterize the forest owner's attitude towards risk, (ii) to analyze the determinants of the forest owner's risk attitude, and (iii) to determine the impact of the forest owner's risk attitude (and other exogenous variables as well) on the probability of harvesting. For this purpose, we assess the French forest owner's risk attitude by means of a questionnaire, using a context-free measure borrowed from experimental economics [27] . The determinants of the forest owner's risk attitude and harvesting decision are estimated through a recursive bivariate ordered probit model. We show that French forest owners are characterized by a relative risk aversion coefficient equals to 1.0025 when we use a power utility function (implying DARA and CRRA). It is the first time that such a risk aversion parameter is estimated for private forest owners. In addition, we find that the forest owner's risk aversion is influenced positively and significantly by the level of risk exposure, geographical location of the forest, and the fact to be a forester, while the income has a negative effect. Finally, we obtain that the forest owner's risk aversion has a positive and significant impact on the harvesting decision. More generally, we propose a methodology combining stated preference data on risk attitude with revealed preference data on harvesting decision, that may be applied to other research questions and other production decisions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives some contextual information about the forest owners and harvesting decision in France. Section 3 presents the methodology we use. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the estimation strategy. Section 6 presents the results, and Section 7 and 8 discuss these results and conclude.
Forest Owners and Harvesting Decision in France
In France, the forest occupies a third of the territory, which represents about 16.7 million hectares. The timber stock is estimated at 2.6 billion m 3 according to IGN [38] . About 75% of the total forest area is private, which amounts to 12.5 million hectares. There are about 3.5 million of private forest owners in France, and 1.1 million of them own at least 1 ha of forest. A survey, conducted in France on the structure of the private forest ownership in 2012 [2] , reveals disparities in terms of forest area distribution between regions. Then, it is in Aquitaine region that the private forest area is the larger (with around 20% of the French private forest area) and in Nord-pas-de-Calais and Alsace that it is the lower, with Bourgogne at the 5th position, ProvenceAlpes-Côte-d'Azur (PACA) at the 6th, Auvergne at 9th, Pays-de-la-Loire at 12th, and Lorraine at 13th. Agreste [2] also indicates that the private forest area is very fragmented in France. The average area of the property of 1 ha or more is estimated at 8.5 ha. Properties between 1 and 4 ha represent 62% of the total number of properties of 1 ha or more, but they only cover 15% of the total forest area. In addition, properties of more than 25 ha represent only 5% of the properties but cover more than 50% of the total area of private forests. This survey also indicates that 1/4 of the French private forest area, of 1 ha or more, has a certification of sustainable management. The aims of forest owners in acquiring the forest are mainly the constitution of a natural asset (35%) and timber production (34%). The preservation of biodiversity and the establishment of a hunting territory concern 11% of owners. This result is in accordance with several studies indicating that the French private forest owners are non-industrial private forest owners, in the sense that they value not only the income from the production of timber but also non-timber amenities of their forest [31, 47] . According to Agreste [2] , about half of the private owners harvest wood from their property for an average estimated volume of 28 million m 3 per year of which 23.2 million m 3 are sold and 5.2 million are for self-consumption. This average harvesting is computed as an average annual volume over the past 5 years. A 5-year period is then used to analyze harvesting decisions of forest owners in the present study but also in the literature [21, 31] .
Methodology
Methods for valuating risk preferences belong to two main categories, revealed preferences and stated preferences methods. Revealed preferences methods rely on observed individual behavior; they have been largely used to quantify risk preferences (see for example Bontems and Thomas [12] for a study on farmers' risk attitude).
Unfortunately, our survey data based on observed harvesting decision do not allow us to construct a direct measure of risk aversion. Due to the lack of additional information on observed risky behavior, we cannot empirically identify the link between risk aversion and harvesting decision in a structural model. In addition, elicitation of risk attitude through revealed preferences data have sometimes been criticized in the literature, in particular because it confuses behavior towards risk with other factors such as resource constraints faced by decision-makers [28] . It may also appear that individuals are more risk averse than they truly are [10] . These facts support our chosen methodology that relies on the elicitation of risk aversion by the mean of a stated preferences approach coming from experimental economics. Then, we combine these experimental data with our survey data to estimate the effect of risk aversion on harvesting in a reduced-form model.
The experimental data are generated from lottery choices as in Musshof and Maart-Noelck [46] and Sauter et al. [51] . Five procedures range in this category: Multiple Price List, Random Lottery Pairs, Becker-DeGroot-Marschak auction, Trade-Off design, and Ordered Lottery Selection [23] . Previous studies [46, 51] favored the Multiple Price List approach proposed by Holt and Laury [36] . However, we retained the Ordered Lottery Selection (OLS) method originally developed in Binswanger (1978) , popularized by Eckel and Grossman [27] and extended by Reynaud and Couture [49] . Three major reasons explained this choice. First, and probably the most important one for us, the measurement of risk attitude bears only on one lottery choice while the other procedures imply up to 20 lottery choices (as in Sauter et al. [51] ). Furthermore, this lottery task is only a brief part of a longer survey, so that we think that a shorter elicitation procedure makes the forest owner's answers more likely. Second, the procedure of Eckel and Grossman [27] has already been used to elicit the risk attitude of a population of other managers of natural resources [49] , namely farmers facing similar natural risks. The third reason why OLS is fine is that we use expected utility theory. In OLS, probabilities are always 1/2 and do not allow the use of alternatives to expected utility theory involving probability distortion.
In the literature, such a context-free method may also be criticized especially because attitude towards risk may be context dependent. For example, Hershey and Schoemaker [35] observe a strong context effect in which insurance choices presented in an insurance context are judged with greater risk aversion than mathematically identical choices presented as standard gambles. Another critic may be about the potential uncertainty aversion generated by the first gamble of the procedure of Eckel and Grossman [27] . However, Reynaud and Couture [49] rule out such a hypothesis. Nevertheless, a context-free measure allows characterizing individual's risk attitude in general and is not linked to a particular framework.
Our approach combining data about forest owner's elicitation of risk preferences (in a stated preferences approach) and revealed preferences data on forest property and harvesting decision has been already used in the past. For instance, Azevedo et al. [7] study the demand for recreation in Iowa wetlands. In the field of consumers' decisions, Guiso and Paiella [34] use household survey data to construct a direct measure of absolute risk aversion based on the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay to buy a risky asset in an experiment. Then, they relate this measure to a set of observed individual choices that in theory should vary with attitude towards risk. This methodology can be fruitfully reproduced to empirically analyze the role of individual's risk attitude on any type of production or individual decision.
Data
This paper combines stated and revealed preferences data. The stated preferences data are used to estimate forest owner preferences towards risk while the revealed preferences data provide potential determinants to explain owner's risk preferences and probability of harvesting.
The Stated Preferences Data
As indicated previously, we implemented an OLS procedure. In this procedure, the subject must choose one gamble that they accept to participate in among five possible ones. This choice allows to infer risk aversion and risk neutrality but not risk-prone behavior. Then, Reynaud and Couture [49] extend the procedure of Eckel and Grossman [27] to risk-prone attitudes. The subject must now choose the gamble they accept out of nine options. We assume that individuals have a power utility function, which in turn implies Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA), a standard assumption in the literature [32] . Table 1 presents the procedure of Reynaud and Couture [49] .
This table presents the nine gambles available to our sample of private forest owners. Each gamble provides payoff 1 and 2 with an equal probability of 50%. Then, the choice of gamble 1 ensures a gain of 40 euros, corresponding to a coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion (RRA) of r > 1.37, i.e., extreme risk-aversion (RA5). Risk Neutrality (RN) appears with the choice of gamble 6, while the choice of gambles 7, 8, or 9 characterizes Risk-Prone (RP) behaviors from RP1, low risk-prone attitude, to RP3, high risk-prone attitude. The procedure here is not incentivized, i.e., gains are purely hypothetical. Several reasons explain this choice. First, traditionally in experimental economics, financial outcome comes from a random selection of one or several decisions taken during the experiment. However, in Eckel and Grossman [27] task, as we used, the individual has only one choice to realize, so that potential financial outcome will depend on this only choice, and we find this option not relevant. Second, a lump-sum payment may also be an option. However, based on our experiences with forest owners, we anticipated that they might not like a lump-sum payment option. Brunette et al. [14, 15] conducted another experiment with forest owners. They explicitly stated that receiving money from us for taking part in the experiment would suggest that they were not interested in the experiment per se but only in the financial incentive. Third, some papers conclude to the absence of difference in terms of decisions between lottery choices using hypothetical or real payoffs [8, 58] . Finally, the fact that the procedure that we used needs only one lottery choice, and the fact that the literature indicates that as soon as the decision that individual has to take is simple lottery task; incentives have no impact on the decision [9] , encourage us to not consider incentive mechanism.
The Revealed Preferences Data
The data come from a survey implemented in 2010 to analyze the capacity of wood mobilization in France, in the context of the European project Newforex. The database is [24] and in Abildtrup et al. [1] . The questionnaire was sent to French private forest owners in five regions with different challenges and forest dynamics: Bourgogne, Pays-de-la-Loire, Auvergne, Lorraine, and Provence-Alpes-Côte-d'Azur. Indeed, they have different rates of forest cover (more than 45% in Lorraine compared to less than 15% in Pays-de-la-Loire) and different proportions of private forest (more than 50% public forests in Lorraine compared to less than 20% in Pays-de-la-Loire, Auvergne, and Bourgogne). In France, the size of properties may be very different (more than 2 million properties are less than 1 ha and nearly 10,000 properties are over 100 ha), so we stratified the sample by size class in each region. We then randomly selected owners from each stratum. The sample was drawn from the database of the association of French private forest owners. The questionnaire was sent by mail to 15,000 private forest owners and 590 questionnaires were completed, corresponding to a response rate of approximately 3.5%. Among these 590 questionnaires, 324 were usable for our study. The questionnaire was composed of three different parts: (1) forest property, (2) wood production, and (3) forest owners. We analyze the representativeness of our sample by comparing some descriptive statistics with those obtained by the survey recently conducted on French private forest owners [2] . First, the average forest area is 65.93 ha in our sample, while in Agreste [2] , the average area among the French private forest owners of 1 ha or more is 8.5 ha. Large forest owners are clearly over-represented. This can be explained by the fact that large forest owners interested in forest management are more willing to participate on a voluntary basis. Second, the average age in the sample is 63.86 years, which is comparable with Agreste [2] , which indicates that French private forest owners are on average 64 years old. Third, our sample is composed with 16% of women and 84% of men. In Agreste [2] , these percentages are 30 and 70%, respectively. Consequently, the proportion of women is underestimated in our sample. To reduce the over-representation of large forest properties, we assign a different weight to each observation, which is the ratio of the total number of properties in the region of the forest owner over the number of properties in the database in the same region. 2 Considering only the forest properties of more than 1 ha, the average area of forest properties after weighting is 8.23 ha, which is close to 8.5 ha in Agreste [2] . The average age of forest owners is 65.23 years. The percentage of women is 20%, which remains a bit lower than the one observed in Agreste [2] . Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for both the initial unweighted sample and a weighted one. We detail the descriptive statistics results for the "Without weighting" column.
Forest Property
The average forest area in the database is 65 ha. Note that 15% of the owners delegate the management of the forest property to a professional. We can observe that 38% of the properties is crossed by a paved road. Table 2 also reveals that 18% of the forest properties are located in the region Lorraine, 17% in Auvergne, 14% in Provence-Alpes-Côte-d'Azur (P ACA), 28% in Pays-de-laLoire (P DL), and 21% in Bourgogne. Finally, the variable EXP O RI SK represents the number of potential risks (nuclear, industrial, technological, earthquake, transport of dangerous goods, landslide, etc.) faced by inhabitants of the department. It is a proxy of the forest owner's level of exposure to risk. This variable was generated from the GASPAR 3 database (assisted management of administrative procedures relating to natural and technological risks) of the French Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development. This means that, on average, in the private forest owner's environment, 522.46 potential hazards are listed. Finally, we can also observe that 33% of the forests of our sample are certified. Indeed, they have the PEFC (Program for
Wood Production
The key variable H ARV EST takes the value 1 if the owner has harvested timber over the past 5 years and 0 otherwise. We think that a 5-year period is long enough to capture any cause of harvesting timber. A shorter period could prevent us to observe harvesting that could have been postponed in the near future because owners expect a price increase in the short run. Conway et al. [21] and Garcia et al. [31] use the same period length. We observe that 61% of the 324 French private forest owners harvested timber over the past 5 years. In addition, the average regional timber price is 55.28e. This corresponds to the average selling price of wood (roadside) by region of the "Office National des Forêts" (National Forest Office). Moreover, 22% of the forest owners in our sample report that they have leisure activities in their forests (variable LEI SU RE), indicating that amenities are clearly associated with forest management by these owners.
Forest Owners
The socio-demographic variables reveal that our database is composed of a majority of nonforesters, who are men, with an average age of 64 years, and 14% have a higher level of education than or equal to a Master's degree. We can also observe that forest income represents on average 4.15% in the forest owners' total wealth (F OREST I NCOME). In our survey, we asked respondents their income range. 4 Taking the center of each class, the average revenue of the owners is e48,382 (I NCOME RANGE). The variable I NCOME SP C is the average annual household income before taxes broken down by socio-professional categories (SPC) in France. It indicates that the average income by socio-professional category is e28,871. This variable comes from the French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE), and has ever been used in Garcia et al. [31] .
Estimation Strategy

Econometric Model
The harvesting decision is influenced by the forest owner's risk aversion [3, 56] and the characteristics of the owner and her/his property [31] . First, we cannot exclude that risk aversion and the harvesting decision share common unobserved factors. Second, it is unlikely that the harvesting decision directly modifies risk aversion, since the latter is an intrinsic characteristic of the individual. Thus, we specify the following recursive bivariate ordered probit model:
where y * 1i stands for the relative risk aversion coefficient of individual i and y * 2i is the latent variable underlying the harvesting decision y 2i (y 2i = 1 if the owner has harvested timber and 0 otherwise). X 1 and X 2 correspond to the vectors of the explanatory variables of the relative risk aversion coefficient (y 1i ) and the harvesting decision (y 2i ), respectively. We also assume that cov( 1i , 2i ) = ρ and we define the empirical counterparts of the latent variables as: (2) and , we show that the weighted log-likelihood function can be written as follows:
where w is the weighting vector as defined in Section 4.2. For more details on the construction of the likelihood function and weighting see Appendix. 5 The cutoff, c j , are known and will therefore not be estimated, so that the risk aversion part of the model is similar to an interval data model or generalized Tobit model (Greene and Hensher (2010) , [57] p. 133 and Cameron and Trivedi (2010), p. 548-550). 6 
Endogeneity Issues
Two potential endogeneity issues must be addressed. First, the variable y 2i (labeled in sections below as RI SK AT T I T UDE) may be endogenous in the system of Eq. 1. We make the assumption that the terms 1i and 2i are correlated. Indeed, common unobservable factors linked to individual tastes may both influence risk aversion and harvesting decision. This assumption allows us to Hence, our instrument satisfies the condition of exogeneity of instruments. We can reasonably consider that our instrument is valid. The second issue concerns individual income (I NCOME RANGE). This variable is a natural candidate to explain both risk aversion and harvesting decision but it may also be correlated to unobservable factors included in error terms of the system of Eq. 1. Indeed, unobservable tastes certainly play a role in the determination of income, risk aversion and harvesting decision. One solution consists in adding one equation for income in the system (1) but this strategy is not parsimonious in regard of the additional parameters to estimate and the limited number of observations we have. Instead, we decide to replace income by its predicted counterpart obtained from an auxiliary model. Using an interval regression, we explain income classes by means of several variables, including the average income by socio-professional categories, the level of education, age, gender and percentage of forest income. The probability associated of Likelihood Ratio (LR) ChiSquare of this model is equal to 0, suggesting that we cannot reject the hypothesis that our explanatory variables have an impact on income. Using this estimation we calculate the mean predicted income for each forest owner (variable I NCOME P REDI CT in the full model below). This method allows us to compute the expected income of forest owners who did not answer to this question. 7 We also use a bootstrap method to compute consistent standard errors for the full model whose results are described in Section 6. The estimation results of this auxiliary regression are shown in Table 3 . According to our results, the average income per SPC, age and education are the main determinants of household income. The pseudo R-square is 0.37, which seems acceptable to use predicted income as explanatory variable in the bivariate model.
Results
Different specifications can be considered according to the number of classes of risk we define to characterize risk attitude or whether we use the weighted or the unweighted sample (see Section 4.2) at the estimation stage. Regarding the number of classes of risk, the elicitation procedure described in Table 1 (3) weighted sample and nine classes, (4) weighted sample and 7 classes. We display in Table 4 below the estimation results of specification (4) . We find that results of specifications (1) to (3) are consistent with those of specification (4), assessing the robustness of our model with respect to the representativeness of the sample and the low number of forest owners in some classes. 9 Indeed, the three main variables driving our analysis are significant and have the same sign whatever the specification. The variable I NCOME P REDI CT has a significant and negative impact on the forest owner's risk aversion, EXP O RI SK has a significant and positive impact on the risk aversion, and RI SK AT T I T UDE is positive and significant regarding its effect on harvesting. In addition, the predicted value of the risk aversion coefficient is close to 1 for all specifications. We then focus below on the results obtained from the weighted sample and the 7 classes of risk aversion.
Risk Attitude
It appears that five variables seem to be determinant when dealing with the risk attitudes of private forest owners, four deal with characteristics of forest owners (I NCOME P REDI CT , F OREST ER, BOU RGOGNE, P ACA) and one with a characteristic of the forest property (EXP O RI SK). The variable EXP O RI SK, concerning the risks associated with the forest property, is positive and significant at the 1% level. This means that the higher the level of risk exposure is, the higher the forest owner's risk aversion will be. The second variable, I NCOME P REDI CT , is negative and significant at 1%, meaning that the lower the predicted income is, the higher the risk aversion will be. This result is consistent with our initial DARA assumption and makes our reduced-form model compatible with the underlying structural model. Our estimation results also indicate that being a forester (variable F OREST ER) has a significant (at 1%) and positive effect on the risk aversion. This is consistent with our expectations because these owners yield much more income from forest. Finally, the variable 8 The empirical distribution among the 7 classes of risk is the following: 43.2% for RA5, 19.1% for RA4, 10.5% for RA3, 5.9% for RA2, 4% for RA1, 8.7% for RN, 8.6% for RP. 9 All the results are available from the authors upon request.
BOU RGOGNE and P ACA are positive and significant at 10%, meaning that the forest location seems to have an impact on the forest owner's risk aversion.
Using the estimated parameters of the equation of risk aversion, we can calculate the predicted value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion for each owner i.e., E y * 1i |X 1i , β 1 =β 1 = X 1iβ1 , and then we compute the weighted average over the sample which is equal to 1 n n 1 w i X 1iβ1 . We obtain a value of 1.0025 (Std. Err. = 0.9578). To our knowledge, this is the first time that such a coefficient has been econometrically estimated for private forest owners. Until now, the value was often arbitrarily fixed and sensitivity analysis was performed (see, for example, Brunette et al. [17] ; Lobianco et al. [44] ). Such an estimation may be very useful for calibrating the model, taking into account forest owner's risk aversion. In addition, this estimation for French private forest owners is in accordance with Arrow [6] who indicated in his seminal work that the coefficient of relative risk aversion should be approximately 1. However, our relative risk aversion coefficient of 1.0025 is higher than the estimation obtained on farmers for example. 10 Indeed, Galarza [30] uses a Holt and Laury [36] approach and find that the Peruvian farmers have an average coefficient of relative risk aversion of 0.45. On a sample of 30 French farmers, Bougherara et al. [13] elicit risk preferences using the Holt and Laury [36] approach, and find a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 0.89. This difference may be explained by the procedure itself. Indeed, procedure itself. Indeed, Reynaud and Couture [49] remark that the Eckel and Grossamn's procedure may generate higher values for the coefficient of RRA than the procedure of Holt and Laury [36] (due to the difference in the number of categories of risk loving). However, using the same approach based on the Eckel and Grossman's procedure, Reynaud and Couture [49] find a coefficient of 0.62 for the French farmers. It is also worth mentioning that one needs to be cautious when comparing coefficients when the utility function may differ. Our apparently high coefficient may be explained by the intrinsic nature of forest management. Indeed, forest management is a long-term process and the period betweeen the investment and the first financial return may be of several years/decades, so that the risk is perceived differently in agriculture and forestry. In agriculture, the occurrence of natural disasters is deeply detrimental from a financial point of view, but the farmer can start a new cycle the next year. The forest manager does not have this opportunity. 10 Our coefficient is not directly comparable with the measures provided by Sauter et al. [51] and Musshof and Maart-Noelck [46] for foresters, i.e., the average number of safe choices realized by the participants. Then, we compare our coefficient with the ones obtained for farmers. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Standard errors take into account clustering due to regional effect
Harvesting Decision
Concerning the harvesting decision, several variables seem to be determinant, some are about the characteristics of the forest owners (RI SK, GENDER, AGE), while others are characteristics of the forest property (DELEGAT I ON, AU V ERGNE, CERT , P AV ED ROAD). The variable RI SK AT T I T UDE affects the harvesting decision positively and significantly. This means that the higher the risk aversion is, the higher the probability of harvesting will be. This result is of particular interest because it is the opposite of the theoretical result obtained in the literature [17, 40] , i.e., increases risk aversion reduces the probability to harvest. When the forest owner has a high risk aversion parameter, s/he has incentives to harvest in order to diminish future potential damage, i.e., the risk exposure effect of Couture and Reynaud [22] . The variables GENDER and AGE have a significant and negative impact on the probability of harvesting. This result suggests that female forest owners harvest less often than men. This result is similar to that obtained by Lidestav and Ekström [41] . According to these authors, this difference may be an expression of differences in social and cultural aspects related to gender, such as education and the division of labor in the family. In addition, this result indicates that older forest owners harvest less often then younger ones. Størdal et al. [54] also found a similar result and suggested that younger owners may have larger debt or be facing large investments in the property, so that increased harvesting may give these owners better liquidity. Another argument is that increasing age is found to decrease the owners' technical efficiency in timber production [42] . Delegating the management of the forest (variable DELEGAT I ON) to a professional has a positive and significant effect on the harvesting decision. The underlying idea of delegated forest management is to adopt best practices, allowing for better financial returns, such that the professional is encouraged to harvest more. This result is also obtained by Garcia et al. [31] at the regional level. The variable AU V ERGNE is positive and significant at 1% meaning that the timber production of private forest owners is more dynamic in AU V ERGNE than in other regions. This result is not surprising given that Auvergne region is associated to a large forest area and a strong wood industry. The variable CERT is positive and significant at 5%, meaning that a certified forest is more likely to be harvested. Indeed, certification is an indicator of sustainable and sound management of timber. The variable P AV ED ROAD is positive and significant at 1%. This result is obvious, since a paved road facilitates the access of the forest owner to the forest and then, the probability of harvesting. Surprisingly, the variable PRICE has a non-significant impact on the harvesting decision (with a positive coefficient). This result is similar to those obtained by Dennis [26] concerning the absence of impact, and opposite to Hyberg and Holthausen [37] who obtained a negative effect. According to these authors, this result could be the consequence of trade-offs made by the owners between forest income (income effect) and amenities (substitution effect). According to Provencher [48] , this result could also be explained by an expectation of rising prices, which pushes owners to postpone their harvests, despite relatively high prices.
Discussion
Our paper provides the determinants of harvesting decision and risk aversion, and the impact of risk aversion on this harvesting decision. In this way, our results have two main implications, in terms of timber harvesting and risk management decisions.
Implications for French Timber Harvesting
France has decided to increase harvesting by 21 million cubic meters until 2020. Although IGN [38] proved this increase as feasible, the French private forest owners will have to provide the largest effort, as they own around 75% of the forest surface. Therefore, the decision-maker needs to know the relevant levers at their disposal in order to increase harvesting in France. Our study presents interesting results in this direction. Indeed, the analysis of the determinants of harvesting decisions reveals a positive effect of some variables, displaying several interesting levers for the decision-maker. Delegating forest management to a professional, the location of the forest in the Auvergne region, forest crossed by a paved road and certified forest are all factors that increase the probability to harvest. Consequently, various approaches may be prioritized by the decision-maker. First, the decision-maker may encourage timber certification through information campaign. Second, delegation of forest management should be encouraged in order to increase harvesting. A way of proceeding can be to encourage forest owners to join cooperatives or associations in order to decrease the cost of management by a professional. Third, observing the wood sector of Auvergne may be interesting to draw useful conclusions for the other regions. Finally, the paved road is clearly a determinant of the harvesting choice, and then, we can easily imagine that the government would help to build such infrastructure. In addition, in some fire prone region such road may also be useful for the firefighting brigade.
Moreover, the variables gender and age have a negative and significant effect on the harvesting decision, so that the public authority may encourage the inheritance towards young women people. Note that the variable price seems to have no effect on the forest owner's harvesting decision, meaning that the timber price do not seem to be a relevant lever for public policy.
Implications for Forest Risk Management
The result of the paper shows that, on average, French private forest owners are risk averse and characterized by a relative risk aversion coefficient of approximately 1. This result means that, as a risk averse decision-maker, the forest owners would like to reduce the risk linked to forest management. For that purpose, they have at their disposal two different ways. On the one hand, they can implement sylvicultural strategies aiming at reducing risk like for instance the reduction of rotation length, which is advocated also as an adaptation strategy to climate change [53] . The reduction of rotation length allows to reduce the height of the tree and then their sensitivity to storm event, but also reduces the time of exposure of the stand to natural events in general. On the other hand, they can also adopt risk-sharing strategies like forest insurance. Indeed, such insurance contract against storm and/or fire exist in France (and also in other European countries). However, only 5% of the French private forest area is insured, and that may be problematic for two main reasons. First, the French government has announced the disappearance of traditional public assistance program in case of natural event occurrence. Such public programs granted individual aid to forest owners for salvage and restoration. 11 Consequently, the only way to be indemnified for the damage caused by natural event is private insurance. Second, forest insurance is advocated as a soft adaptation strategy to face climate change, and in this case, the challenge for the governments is to encourage forest owners to adopt insurance [16] .
In this context, our paper brings two main insights. First, a well-known result in insurance economics is that as risk aversion increases, insurance demand increases too [6] . One of our result indicates that the exposition to some risks has a positive effect on risk aversion. Consequently, as climate change should have a positive impact on the occurrence and intensity of natural events, we may expect that both the exposure and the risk aversion would be higher, and as a consequence, the insurance demand would increase in the near future. Second, our results indicate that a forest located in Bourgogne or in Paca, correspond to a higher degree of risk aversion. Consequently, we could expect that the forests in these regions be more insured than those in the other regions.
Conclusion
This paper aims to analyze the forest owner's risk aversion and its impact on the probability of harvesting. For this purpose, we use a database on forest owner's characteristics, forest property, and wood production. We implement an ordered probit model to jointly estimate the determinants of risk aversion and the determinants of the probability to harvest. Our results reveal that the mean relative risk aversion coefficient of the French forest owners is 1.0025 for our specification. The risk aversion is positively and significantly impacted by the level of risk exposure, geographical location of the forest, and the fact to be a forester, while the income has a negative effect. The positive and significant determinants of the probability of harvesting are the risk aversion, the delegation of the forest management, the certification of the timber and the fact that the forest is crossed by a paved road and located in Auvergne region. Finally, gender and age have a negative and significant effect on harvesting.
This study identifies a channel by which characteristics of forest owner, forest property, and wood production affect the forest owner's decisions: the forest owner's attitude towards risk. The relationship between these characteristics and risk attitude, as well as the link between risk attitude and probability of harvesting are useful in several ways. First, this study indicates how the characteristics of the forest owner, forest property, and wood production influence the behavior of private forest owners. The introduction of risk attitude into research on private forest owners may help to understand their decisions and guide their future management choices related to climate change adaptation for example. Previous studies showed that the private forest owner's harvesting decision is impacted by risk attitude, so that displaying the underlying relationships is essential. Second, it allows the forest owners to improve the individual knowledge and therefore to adopt more efficient management strategies. Third, this study also contributes to public policy issue. Indeed, we show that risk aversion increases the forest owner's probability to harvest. However, such a reaction to risk has numerous effects for the economy in terms of timber production, carbon storage, provision of non-market services, etc. For example, a higher risk aversion means to harvest more often, so that the time of the carbon storage is lower. In addition, the forest sector should adapt to this new harvesting planning. Consequently, such kind of studies may help to select appropriate strategies or public policy tools.
A way to improve this paper will be to take into account the dynamics of timber production. Indeed, timber comes from a long-term dynamic biological process that is not considered in this research. However, to conduct such a study, we would need panel data over the long term, because some characteristics of the forest owner and the property, such as attitude towards risk for example, show very few variations in the short term. We show that the geographical location influences the coefficient of relative risk aversion. By relaxing the assumption that the risk parameter is only individual-specific, it could be interesting to analyze the existence of spatial interdependence of forest owner's attitude towards risk. 
Appendix: Maximum likelihood estimation
Following Sajaia [50] , we show that the probability that y 1i = j and y 2i = 1 or 0: P r(y 1i = j, y 2i = 0) = P r(y * 1i <c j , y * 2i < 0) −P r(y * 1i <c j −1 , y * 2i < 0) and P r(y 1i = j, y 2i = 1) = P r(y * 1i < c j ) − P r(y * 1i < c j −1 ) −P r(y * 1i < c j , y * 2i < 0) +P r(y * 1i < c j −1 , y * 2i < 0) The system of Eq. 1 can be estimated by the maximum likelihood method. Indeed, we assume that ( 1i , 2i ) ∼ N(0, ) with = 1 ρ ρ 1 ; thus, we get:
P r(y 1i = j, y 2i = 0) = P r( 1i < c j − X 1i β 1 , γ 1i + 2i −γ X 1i β 1 − X 2i β 2 ) P r( 1i < c j −1 −X 1i β 1 , γ 1i + 2i −γ X 1i β 1 − X 2i β 2 )
Given If we assume that the observations are independent, the loglikelihood function can be written as follows:
I (y 1i = j, y 2i = k) ln P r(y 1i = j, y 2i = k)
The maximum weighted likelihood estimator can be written as:
w i I (y 1i = j, y 2i = k) ln P r(y 1i = j, y 2i = k)
where w is the weighting vector.
